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ABSTRACT 
 
This study is centered on the problem related to the reclamation work for the construction 
of Tanjung Piai Maritime Industrial Park in the Tanjung Pelepas port limit. The main aim 
is to identify the potential risk and probability of marine accident during the reclamation 
phases. The existing condition of the waterway had been used as the baseline to compare 
with future condition. For the purpose of analysis, Formal Safety Assessment (FSA) method 
and Fault Tree Analysis (FTA) technique had been deployed, coupled with the AIS data 
and marine accidents report provided by Johor Port Authority (JPA) and Malaysian 
Marine Department (MARDEP). The result of the analysis indicates that navigational risk 
mainly originated from human error. Thus, navigational safety would improve significantly 
if the vessels follow the mitigation measures recommended in this study. 
 
Keywords: Risk assessment, marine accidents, formal safety assessment, fault tree 
analysis 
 
 
1.0 INTRODUCTION 
 
Operating at the tip of Southwest Johor, the reclamation work for the man-made island of 
the Petroleum Hub and Maritime Industrial Park is currently ongoing. The reclamation 
work will cover a total area of 3,487 acres, will be reclaimed in three, which is expected to 
take fifteen years to complete. After obtaining a full environmental impact assessment (EIA) 
approval in June 2016, the first phase of the project is expected to be operational by early 
2020 [1]. 
As shown in Figure 1, with its position at the end of the Straits of Malacca, the 
reclamation area is just over one kilometer south of the Tanjung Bin Power Plant, and the 
navigation channel for the Port of Tanjung Pelepas (PTP) runs parallel to the eastern 
boundary of the project site. The Port of Tanjung Pelepas is among the busiest shipping 
container ports in the world. The same waterway is also used by influxes of ships entering 
and leaving Tanjung Bin Power Plant. 
______________________ 
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In addition to that, there are other marine industries around Sungai Pulai, for instance 
the Asia Terminal Hub (ATB). Therefore, there is a strong likelihood that the waterway 
will be congested with marine vessels during the reclamation process. 
The purpose of this study is firstly to identify potential marine accidents that might occur 
due to the existence of the reclaimed area, secondly to address the type of accident and 
consequences, and thirdly to propose mitigation measure in order to reduce such potential 
accident. The risk assessment was carried out using Formal Safety Assessment (FSA), 
incorporated with Fault Tree Analysis (FTA). The authority, such as the MARDEP of 
Malaysia and JPA can benefit from the outcome from this study by adopting effective 
measures to enhance safety in navigation due to the existence of the reclamation area. 
 
 
Figure 1: Reclamation area [1] 
 
 
2.0 LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
A number of studies have been conducted to assess risk and ship accidents in narrow 
waterway. The moment a ship is caught up in a marine accident there will be series of 
potential disasters with distinct consequences [2]. 
 
2.1 Method 
Many methods had been used in previous studies for risk assessment such as Fault Tree 
Analysis (FTA), Bayesian Networks (BN), Formal Safety Assessment (FSA), Event Tree 
Analysis (ETA) and Quantitative Risk Assessment (QRA). Three methods have been 
selected for discussion in this paper due to their frequency of use in marine accident 
analysis in recent years. Based on the literature search using an academic bibliographic 
database in field of safety and engineering (Science Direct, December 2017), BN, FTA and 
FSA have been frequently used for risk assessment during the period of 2013-2017. 
The FSA method was introduced by the International Maritime Organization (IMO) as 
a frame work for risk assessment and management. Various maritime risk assessments had 
been conducted using the FSA guidelines [3, 4]. FSA method deploys the technique of risk 
and cost-benefits assessment to assist in making decision, and is considered a proven 
approach to marine safety [4]. The method was applied to estimate the navigation risk of 
Yangtze River. In fact, the International Maritime Organization (IMO) has recommended 
the method as an integrated safety system to all maritime sectors [3]. However, Goerlandt 
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claimed that there is a possibility of imprecise risk measurement due to subjective 
judgments and uncertainty of risk while performing FSA [5]. 
The FTA is the graphical illustration of the logic combination of causes associated with 
an undesirable event or situation [6]. In [7], Uğurlu et al. focused on collision occurring in 
oil tanker and used programmed FTA to carry out risk assessment. They used FTA method 
to analyze the reasons of an undesirable event. This method consists of two stages, which 
are qualitative and quantitative. The collision data in the study was obtained from Global 
Integrated Ship Information System (GISIS). The data was used to classify accidents and 
to put recommendation to prevent reiteration of such accident. Uğurlu [6] used FTA method 
to determine significant level of the root causes of F&E accident in oil tanker, and used 
Fuzzy extended AHP (FAHP) to describe the correlation between the root causes of 
accident and their causative factors; in line with the findings obtained by Uğurlu et al. [7]. 
The author investigated maritime accident report on fire and explosion (F&E) which 
occurred in oil tanker, as well as accident data, taken from GISIS accident report. Another 
application of FTA in ship collision assessment was made by Kum and Sahin [8]. To 
prevent future incidents from happening and to clarify the causes, the authors proposed 
Root Cause Analysis (RCA). In order to propose a recommendation to reduce the 
occurrence probabilities, FTA was applied. FTA can also be used in a qualitative manner 
in accident analysis to help identify underlying causes of accident and identify what can be 
done to prevent similar accident in the future [6]. Nonetheless, FTA is a complicated 
process and it requires a considerable amount of time to complete [8]. 
The BN model has been a popular method for risk assessment, especially for the 
modeling of rare accident [9]. Similar to FTA, BN modeling consists of both qualitative 
and quantitative part. Afenyo et al. reviewed that BN offers the opportunity to model 
interdependencies among the casual factors to researchers [10]. They claimed that this is 
not likely in conventional methods such as the FTA. They presented methodology to 
analyze arctic shipping accident scenario using BN, in which the same methodology can 
be applied to a scenario involving a collision between a vessel and iceberg. Alternatively, 
Goerlandt and Montewka proposed a framework for risk analysis of maritime 
transportation systems, applied with BN modeling for probabilistic risk quantification [11]. 
To select the most appropriate method for the study, various factors must be taken into 
account. Based on the above discussion, it is very clear that the Formal Safety Assessment 
(FSA) method and Fault Tree Analysis (FTA) Technique would serve as the most viable 
mechanism to carry out the study, due to the fact that both methods have been proven to be 
accurate and sustainable. 
 
2.2 Data Sources 
Various responsible factors need to be considered for the causes of ship collision, such as 
weather, route selection, personnel training, use of equipment, and human factors. There 
are various existing data sources that can be used to analyze the accident factors such as 
Automatic Identification System (AIS) data, Port State Control Inspection (PSCI) record, 
Global Integrated Ship Information System (GISIS), government document and expert 
group. 
AIS data is increasingly preferred as main source of information for marine accident 
studies such as in [2, 9, 12]. AIS is a technology which makes ships visible to each other 
[2]. AIS data consists of the Maritime Mobile Service Identity (MMSI) number, latitude 
and longitude position, speed, ship type, destination, etc. AIS is made applicable to vessel 
300 GT in international traffic and 500 GT engaged in domestic voyages, as well as all 
tankers and passenger ships irrespective of size [12]. 
Chai et al. developed a QRA model to evaluate the risk of a ship being involved in a 
ship collision [2]. The study approximately calculated the frequency and consequence of 
possible accident scenarios using ETA, and a case study was developed based on one month 
real time ship movement from AIS data in the Malacca Straits. Similarly, Zhang and Thai 
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used AIS data to enhance the Novel Model method for detecting near miss ship-ship 
encounter [9]. Xiao et al. also used AIS data to explore actual behavior of ships but it is 
narrowed to restricted waterway in China and Netherlands [12]. The same measure was 
also adopted in [13] where the authors analyzed risk of ship collision in the Barents Sea in 
2030 due to the expectation that the Barents Sea will be a major contributor to oil and gas 
production. The researchers used simulation tool IWRAP Mk2 and used AIS data to create 
a density plot for the traffic of a particular area. Zaman et al. analyzed human error using 
m-SHEL model, and the model was used to establish collision avoidance [14]. The 
International Regulations for Preventing Collisions at Sea 1972 (COLREG) and AIS data 
are used to establish the m-SHEL analysis. 
PSCI is used to inspect foreign ships entering national ports to check the condition of 
the ship and its equipment, besides to ensure the ship is manned and operated under 
requirements of international regulations [15]. They developed BN model for risk analysis. 
PSCI data was used to find out the interaction between the numbers of various types of 
deficiencies found on a ship and ship involvement in marine traffic accident. They found 
that the limitation in the deficiencies data might be due to bias of inspector’s interpretation, 
thus it is uncertain whether there has been any recorded deficiencies indicator of safety. 
To minimize accident, it is vital to determine the root causes and the factor behind the 
root causes [7]. In that study, the causative factors were determined using experts’ opinion, 
similar with those in study by [6] while Zhang and Thai [9] analyzed expert’s involvement 
in BN application for maritime modeling. They claimed that the expert’s knowledge plays 
an important role in the establishment of the BN structure and defining the relative 
probability but they found that involvement of expert’s judgment would bring uncertainty 
and biases. 
Mou et al. presented a study of vessel traffic safety in busy waterway by referring to a 
case study of accidents in the port of Shenzhen [16]. The accident data and vessel traffic 
patterns were collected from Shenzhen Maritime Safety Administrator (MSA). The study 
proposed a framework of safety indexes to evaluate risk level in busy waterway. Similarly, 
Balto used government documents to simulate the frequency of ship collision using 
simulation tool IWRAP Mk2 [13]. 
Based on the above discussion, it is very clear that the FSA method and FTA technique 
would serve as a viable mechanism to carry out the study. This is due to the fact that both 
methods have been proven to be accurate and sustainable. 
This study also uses AIS data and government record to study characteristic of vessel 
traffic and utilizes the data to further improve safety navigation in Tanjung Pelepas Port 
Limit. Most importantly, the AIS data is the only data that is relevant to the specific kind 
of reclamation impact in this study due to the fact that AIS displays both the static and 
dynamic ship data. 
 
 
3.0 INCORPORATION OF FSA METHOD AND FTA TECHNIQUE 
 
This study focused on the application of the first route of the FSA flowchart as shown in 
Figure 2 which includes Steps 1, 2 and 5 to the Tanjung Pelepas Port Limit. The risk will 
be identified with reference to AIS and historical data, then strengthened with experts’ 
judgment by identifying the actual circumstances of hazard that may occur in Tanjung 
Pelepas Port Limit. This is followed by ranking all potential hazardous scenarios that could 
lead to significant consequences, and finally prioritizing them by risk level. 
Finally, the risk assessment to analyze the causes and consequences of the hazardous 
scenarios will be modelled in FTA in accordance with a risk matrix, considering both the 
probability and consequences of the navigational risk. 
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Figure 2: FSA flowchart [17] 
 
3.1 Hazard Identification (Step 1) 
In this section, the main objectives are to systematically identify all conceivable and 
relevant hazards of a marine accident that have potential to cause harm to human life, 
environment or any other third party. The expert judgments, AIS and historical data of 
marine accidents that happened from 2015 to 2017 within the Tanjung Pelepas Port Limit 
were used to identify the hazard. 
 
3.1.1 Marine accidents statistic 
Figure 3 shows five categories of marine accidents, as given by the JPA, namely collision, 
grounding, contact, oil spill and others. Their individual percentage in terms of accident 
numbers in the past years from 2015 to 2017 are shown in Table 1. In the 3-year period, 33 
accidents occurred, resulting in 61% oil spills, 15% collisions, 9% contacts, 9% grounding, 
and 6% others. 
The marine accident investigation record covering 3-year period (2015-2017) provided 
by MARDEP as presented in Figure 4 shows that the most common cause of accident in 
the Tanjung Pelepas Port Limit is due to personal failure. Based on this data, collision and 
grounding accidents should be prevented as they may cause total losses or un-seaworthiness 
to the ship, and may cause negative consequences to the personnel and environment. 
 
 
Figure 3: Marine accident statistics in Tanjung Pelepas Port Limit (Source: JPA) 
 
Table 1: Ship accidents categories (2015-2017) in Tanjung Pelepas Port Limit 
Accident 
Categories Occurrences Percentage % Rank 
Oil spill  20 61 1 
Collision  5 15 2 
Grounding  3 9 3 
0
2
4
6
8
10
2015 2016 2017
N
um
be
r 
of
 a
cc
id
en
ts Oil Spill
Collision
Grounded
Contact
Others
Decision Makers 
Step 1 
Hazard Identification 
Step 2 
Risk Assessment 
Step 5 
Decision Making Recommendations 
Step 3 
Risk Control Options 
 
Step 4 
Cost Benefit Assessment 
 
Mansor M., Kader A.S.A. and Jalal M.R., 
Jurnal Mekanikal, June 2019, 42: 1-13. 
 
6 
 
Contact 3 9 3 
Others 2 6 4 
Total 33 100  
Source: JPA 
 
 
Figure 4: Accident causes (Source: MARDEP) 
 
3.1.2 AIS database 
In the three-year period, the traffic development has witnessed continuous growth, from 
8390 to 9918 vessels, as presented in Table 2. Among the traffic volume, containers and 
tankers are the dominant vessels. However, the number of ships in other categories has also 
increased over the three years. According to JPA, “sand carrier” has been placed in “others” 
category, by which the increasing traffic volume in this category is probably due to the 
influx of sand carriers. This development of traffic density justifies the need to be alert of 
potential marine accident assessment in the study. 
 
Table 2: Traffic development in Tanjung Pelepas Port Limit 
Year / 
Types Container Tanker 
Tug 
& 
Barge 
Bunker Bulk Carrier Others Total 
2015 4572 2057 204 1095 95 367 8390 
2016 4318 2573 438 897 108 498 8832 
2017 4231 2744 583 879 111 1370 9918 
Source: JPA 
 
Data given by MARDEP reveals that four types of vessels have obtained operating 
permission to work at the reclamation area since 2016, as presented in Table 3. Data in 
Figure 5 shows that 89% vessels which are working with the reclamation project are 
registered outside Malaysia. 
 
3.1.3 Expert judgment 
Expert judgment is needed to identify the actual circumstances of hazard that may occur in 
Tanjung Pelepas Port Limit. In this study, the judgment from an expert team from the 
MARDEP had been sought to. The team used the Checklist Analysis method to identify 
marine accident scenarios between sand carrier/tug, barge and commercial marine vessel 
within Tanjung Pelepas Port Limit. Based on the discussion with the expert team, the 
checklist questionnaire to identify hazards due to reclamation activity had been produced. 
If majority of the respondents answered "Yes," the navigational risk in Tanjung Pelepas 
Port Limit risk is high. 
 
54.50%
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30.00%
0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60%
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Table 3: Vessels used at the reclamation area 
Type of Vessel Percentage % 
Flat top barge  36 
Tug boat 31 
Sand carrier  24 
Crane barge 9 
Total 100 
Source: MARDEP 
 
 
Figure 5: Port registers of marine vessel working at the reclamation area (Source: MARDEP) 
 
3.1.4 Risk rank 
The objective of this step is to rank all potential hazardous scenarios in Tanjung Pelepas 
Port Limit that could lead to significant consequences, by prioritising them by risk level. 
Risk ranking matrix is done by expert judgement and supported by historical and AIS data. 
Ranked risk starts from the most severe as recommended in IMO guidelines. The risk 
matrix allocates each hazard to a probability and severity category, followed by giving form 
of ranking of the risk that is associated with that hazard. Risk can be characterized as 
Equation 1. Risk Index or risk ranking number is obtained by adding the probability and 
severity indices as in Equation (2). 
 
Risk = Probability (P) ×Severity (S)     (1) 
 
Risk Index = Probability Index + Severity Index   (2) 
 
The scale to determine the Probability Index and Severity Index was constructed based 
on IMO (MSC/Circ. 1023, 2002) as shown in Tables 4 and 5. Meanwhile, the Risk Index 
of Tanjung Pelepas Port Limit is presented in Table 6. 
 
Table 4: Probability Index 
Ulaanbatar
39%
Portmouth
22%
Belize
11%
Port Klang
11%
Others
17%
PI Frequency (F) Definition F (per ship year) 
7 Frequent Likely to occur once per month on one ship 10 
5 Reasonably probable Likely to occur once per year in a fleet of 10 ships 0.1 
3 Remote Likely to occur once per year in fleet of 100 ships  10‾³ 
1 Extremely remote Likely to occur once in the lifetime (20 years) of fleet of 1000 ships 10‾⁵ 
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Table 5: Severity Index 
SI Severity (S) 
Effect on Human, Environment & 
Ship 
S 
(Equivalent 
Fatalities) 
1 Minor Single slight injury and requiring first aid Minor damage and operational disruption 0.01 
2 Significant  
Multi minor or single major injury and requiring more than first 
aid 
Some environmental damage and spill can be limited within the 
immediate incident area 
Damage to vessel with longer operational disruption and financial 
loss 
0.1 
3 Severe 
Severe and multiple major injuries requiring hospitalization or 
single fatality 
Major environmental impact with release of hazardous or polluting 
substances with the potential of spreading outside port boundary 
Major damage to vessel with major operational disruption 
1 
4 Catastrophic 
Multiple fatalities 
Extreme environmental impact with major release of hazardous or 
polluting substances with significant threat to environmental 
amenity 
Loss of vessel, navigational disruption over an extended period 
10 
 
Table 6: Risk Index 
PI Frequency  
Severity Index (SI) 
1 2 3 4 
Minor Significant  Severe Catastrophic 
7 Frequent 8 9 10 11 
6  7 8 9 10 
5 Reasonably probable 6 7 8 9 
4  5 6 7 8 
3 Remote 4 5 6 7 
2  3 4 5 6 
1 Extremely remote 2 3 4 5 
Low Risk (2≤ Score ≤ 4), Medium Risk (5≤ Score ≤ 8), High Risk (Score ≥ 9) 
 
3.1.5 Risk Index scoring  
Table 7 presents Risk Index scoring and Risk Rank to Tanjung Pelepas Port Limit. In this 
study, risk is explained by the probability of event which causes damage and its severity, 
thus the risk can be considered low even the severity is high, if an event has a low 
probability. Hazards were identified through the highest score of Risk Index. The highest 
score indicates the likelihood of hazards. 
 
Table 7: Risk Index scoring to Tanjung Pelepas Port Limit 
Risk 
Rank 
Risk 
Category Possible Hazardous Scenarios 
Probability 
Index (PI) 
Severity 
Index 
(SI) 
Risk 
Index 
(RI) 
1 Collision 
Inbound/outbound vessel from PTP/North 
Sungai Pulai comes in contact with sand 
carrier/tug and barge due to 
miscommunication  
7 4 11 
2 Collision Small vessel comes in contact with sand carrier/tug and barge 7 3 10 
 Collision 
Sand carrier/tug and barge comes in 
contact with other vessels or vice versa due 
to miscommunication 
5 4 9 
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3 Collision Westbound vessels come in contact with sand carrier/tug and barge 5 4 9 
4 Collision 
Inbound/outbound vessel from PTP/North 
Sungai Pulai comes in contact with sand 
carrier/tug and barge due to restricted 
visibility (heavy rain, storm, haze) 
5 4 9 
5 Collision 
Between inbound/outbound VLCC and 
sand carrier/tug and barge approaching 
towards to PTP 
5 4 9 
6 Collision Sand carrier/tug and barge comes in contact with Ship to Ship vessel 5 3 8 
7 Collision Sand carrier/tug and barge comes in contact with daughter vessel 5 3 8 
6. Collision 
Sand carrier/tug and barge comes in 
contact with mother vessel due to 
misjudgment of current flow 
5 3 8 
8 Collision Sand carrier/tug and barge accidently comes in contact with anchorage vessel 5 2 7 
9 Collision 
Small vessel comes in contact with sand 
carrier/tug and barge due to 
miscommunication 
5 2 7 
10 Collision 
Sand carrier/tug and barge comes in 
contact with other vessel or vice versa due 
to inadequate space 
3 4 7 
11 Collision 
Sand carrier/tug and barge comes in 
contact with other vessel or vice versa due 
to inadequate lighting 
3 4 7 
12 Grounding Sand carrier/tug and barge grounding due to attempt to avoid fishing vessel  5 2 7 
13 Grounding 
Sand carrier/tug and barge tries to avoid 
any westbound vessel resulting in 
grounding  
5 2 7 
14 Collision 
Sand carrier/tug and barge comes in 
contact with reclamation vessel at Benalec 
area or vice versa  
3 3 6 
15 Grounding Sand carrier/tug and barge grounding to reclamation due to shallow patches  1 2 3 
16 Collision Sand carrier/tug and barge suffers engine failure  3 1 1 
 
 
4.0 RISK ASSESSMENT (STEP 2) 
 
In this section, the main objective is to analyze the causes and consequences of the 
hazardous scenarios identified in Step 1 using FTA. Based on these assessments, existing 
risk control measures were reviewed and additional or improved control measure will be 
recommended. 
 
4.1 FTA for Collision and Grounding 
In this study, FTA was used to construct risk contribution diagrams based on expert 
judgments. The objective is to determine the probability of hazard which has been 
identified in Step 1. When the combination of causes of the hazard were deﬁned and 
constructed, the next step was to build a logical relation between reasons using minimal cut 
sets. A minimal cut set represents the smallest combination of component failure. In the 
event of all failure, the top event will occur. The collision and grounding accidents FTA 
are shown in Figures A1 and A2, respectively in the Appendix. 
 
4.2 Minimal Cut Sets for Collision and Grounding Accidents 
From the FTA analysis, 11 single component minimum cut sets and 2 double component 
causing occurrence of collision accidents have been found. This analysis indicates that 
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collision accident can be caused by events P1, OR P2, OR P3, OR P4, OR P5, OR P6, OR 
P7, OR P8, OR P9, OR P10, OR P11, OR P12 AND P13 OR, and P14 AND P15. In 
comparison, events P2, P3, P4, P5, P6, P7, P8, P9, P12 and P13 are associated with human 
errors. 
There are 8 single component minimum cut sets and 2 double component causing 
occurrence of the grounding accidents. This shows that the grounding accidents can be 
caused by events P1, OR P2, OR P5, OR P6, OR P9, OR P10, OR P3 AND P4, OR P7 
AND P8, where event P1, P2, P5, P6, P7 and P8 are associated with human errors. Hence, 
from this analysis, human error is a common-cause of failure to cause collision and 
grounding accident. 
 
 
5.0 DECISION-MAKING AND RECOMMENDATION (STEP 5) 
 
From the risk analysis, most marine accidents are caused by human error. In order to reduce 
marine accidents affected by human error, the perceptible recommendations are as follows: 
• Malaysian crew on-board: 
Early initial communication is important to synchronize vessels movement 
throughout operating within the Tanjung Pelepas Port Limit. Language barrier to 
communicate with local vessel especially with fishing vessel contributes to marine 
casualties. Every working construction vessel at the reclamation project must fit at 
least one Malaysian crew who can communicate with both local vessel and vessel 
with multi-national crews on-board.  
• Pilotage: 
Pilotage is compulsory for every marine construction vessel when entering and 
leaving the Tanjung Pelepas Port Limit. No exception is allowed due to the 
limitation and constraints of marine traffic especially at the south of the reclamation 
area. Generally, the authority may only grant exemption after 10 movements of a 
vessel by the same master. 
• Collision Regulation at Sea (COLREG) 72: 
Every master of marine construction vessel should navigate with caution in 
accordance with the International Regulation For Preventing Collision at Sea 
(COLREG) such as proceeding at safe speed, posting additional look outs, 
exhibiting navigational light, using appropriate sound signal and monitoring ship 
radar and AIS to detect presence of ship in its vicinity. Reviewing and updating the 
training of crew working on board with the project could be helpful. 
• Safety Inspections: 
Every marine construction vessel involved in the reclamation area must undergo 
safety inspection before work permission is granted. Any poor vessel should not 
be allowed to operate in the project area. Periodical safety inspection every six 
months to every vessel which has gained working approval should be the practice. 
• Navigation watch: 
Additional watch keeping on bridge shall be imposed when transiting during dark 
hours, when visibility is restricted or during heavy weather and haze. The officer 
in charge shall at all the time keep a close look out for every approaching vessel, 
especially with fishing vessel and navigation, to check for any sign of drifting or 
while at anchor. 
 
 
6.0 CONCLUSION 
 
This paper has presented six high-level hazards as mentioned in Table 7. The main cause 
of occurrence of collision and grounding accidents in Tanjung Pelepas Port Limit is related 
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to human fault, namely improper voyage plan, selection of inappropriate anchorage area, 
use of inappropriate navigation chart, violation of navigation safety notice, fatigue, 
communication failure, pilotage failure, lack of situational awareness, non-compliance 
with regulation and deviation from suggested route. Based on the study, the reclamation 
project will further cause navigational constriction within the port limit with imminent 
danger lurking to happen. Therefore, it will only be safe to proceed with the reclamation 
project if all the mitigations measures recommended in this study are followed and adhered 
to by the parties concerned. This work is just the beginning; there are still much work need 
to do. From this study, further analyses are still necessary as follows: 
 Study on marine accidents by other ship types to reveal the cause of accidents. 
 Simulation study on marine construction vessel when entering and leaving the port 
limit to gauge the level of safety. 
 Study on actual ship speed by monitoring AIS, which is valuable in real time risk 
analysis in the Tanjung Pelepas Port Limit. 
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Figure A1: Fault Tree for collision accident 
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Figure A2: Fault Tree for grounding accident 
